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Abstract. In this paper we examine the question of whether a collective activity can influence cooperation in a 
subsequent repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. We conduct two series of experiments. The first 
consists of control experiments in which 30 periods of a PD game are played, with a random re-matching of the 
pairs in every period. In a second series of experiments, subjects first play a donation game and then the PD 
game. In the donation game they collectively discuss the amount of a donation to a given charity, before putting 
the question to an individual and anonymous vote. Cooperation levels in the PD games preceded by the donation 
game are significantly lower than those observed in the control experiment.  
                                                           
1 Correspondence to: Alexis.Garapin@grenoble.inra.fr. We acknowledge the assistance of Jean-Loup Dupuis 
(GAEL, Grenoble) in programming the software for the PD game experiment. We thank Laurent Muller (GAEL, 
Grenoble) and Yoella Bereby-Meyer (Ben Gurion University) for their comments on an early version of this 
work. We also thank Jean-Luc Girardet, treasurer of the Banque Alimentaire de l’Isère (Isère Food Bank). 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Conference of the Association Française de Science 
Economique (AFSE) on Behavioural and Experimental Economics (Lyon, May 2007) and at the  IVth 
International Meeting of Behavioural and Experimental Economics (Alicante, March 2008). We thank an 
anonymous referee and the editor for providing helpful comments and suggestions.   2
When a precedent of donation favors defection in the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
To appear in the German Economic Review 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
In the repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game experiments, conducted with 
random “stranger” re-matching in every period, defection is prevalent and only a small core of 
persistent cooperators is observed (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Cooper et alii, 1996). A recent 
experiment conducted by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) to compare learning processes in 
deterministic payoff conditions with those in probabilistic payoff conditions, both in stranger 
and in partner matching protocols, produced similar findings: in their “strangers” treatment, 
aggregate cooperation rates are as high as 40% in the first ten periods of the experiment, and 
down to 10% after 180 periods of play. These authors conclude that, in one-shot games, what 
players actually learn is to not cooperate. 
To increase cooperation, some researchers have exhaustively studied the effect of 
different structural factors such as discounting rate in repeated games, free or costly 
punishment, payoffs, strategy labels, periods, communication, etc. (see Sally, 1995 and 
Ledyard, 1995, for surveys). However, recent literature shows that a precedent (i.e. a shared 
experience of playing another game) may have effects on cooperation that are much greater 
than these structural factors. A previous experience in playing a different game can allow 
players to establish reputations that can signal a player’s likely behavior across alternative 
games. This paper contributes to these researches, by exploring the question of whether a 
collective activity can influence cooperation in a subsequent repeated one shot PD game.  
In the case of subsequent repeated one shot games, phenomena like reciprocity (Gintis, 
Bowles, Boyd, Fehr, 2005) are not likely to appear, as players are re-matched from one period 
to another
2. However, a precedent of collective decision-making may cause individuals to 
change their attitude, by making them more sensitive to others' welfare. On the other hand, the 
preliminary game may also make individuals aware of others' potential strategic defection 
behaviors. In this case, individuals would learn to defect, even faster than in a non-repeated 
game without precedent.  
Two articles, Knez and Camerer (2000) and Ahn, Ostrom, Schmidt, Shup and 
Walker (2001), investigate whether a precedent of playing coordination games can affect the 
level of cooperation in a subsequent PD game. Knez and Camerer (2000) use a partner 
procedure: participants play with a same partner in every phase of the experiment, though the 
pairing is anonymous. Ahn et alii (2001) use either partner or stranger procedure. Both studies 
share a same information structure: (1) subjects are aware that two phases would occur, but 
they are not informed of the structure of the second phase until the first phase is over and (2) 
they are not informed about their opponent's first phase behavior in the second phase. 
However, subjects play five periods of each phase in Knez and Camerer (2000), while in Ahn 
et alii (2001) they play one shot PD games after 8 periods of play of a series of coordination 
games. Subjects who play the PD game as if it were a coordination game may base their play 
in this game on their beliefs that others also view it as a coordination game. Knez and 
Camerer (2000) observe that a large majority of subjects converge to the Pareto-dominant 
equilibrium in the coordination game. This precedent of efficiency significantly increases the 
level of cooperation in the first period of the subsequent PD game
3. The increase in 
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the control treatments.   3
cooperation is greater when the coordination game and the PD game have descriptive 
similarity. Ahn et alii (2001) investigate the frequency of cooperative play in four one shot 
PD games as a function of the payoff structure of these games and the history of prior play in 
their series of coordination games. Their study supports the findings of Knez and Camerer 
(2000)
4. The precedent effect is stronger in magnitude than the effect of changing payoffs. 
Ahn et alii (2001) observe also that the precedent effect is stronger when individuals are 
matched repeatedly with the same person in previous play, as contrasted to being matched 
with another player.  
Knez and Camerer (2000) and Ahn et alii (2001) use games that have a descriptive 
similarity: players play a coordination game before playing a PD game. This mainly explains 
their finding that a precedent of efficient coordination strengthens cooperation in a PD game. 
But the question of cooperation transfer can also be assessed with more generality using 
games which have no descriptive similarity, as investigated by Albert, Güth, Kirchler and 
Maciejovsky (2007). These authors designed an experiment with so-called “connected 
games”, involving different tasks “connected” by an information spillover: prior decisions 
were a source of information for later ones. The precedent of play could therefore depend here 
on very different games. The experiment was divided into two stages. In the first stage, 
participants received an initial endowment and were separated randomly into two groups. It 
was then proposed that they donate a share of this amount to one charity from a pre-
determined list. Votes were individual and anonymous. In the second stage, which was not 
announced at the beginning of the experiment, participants played a one shot-game (only one 
period): either a trust game or a PD game. They were informed of their partner’s donation 
share and group affiliation. Results show that participants’ cooperation decisions were 
sensitive to their opponent’s individual donation but not to their group affiliation. This 
experiment suggests that decisions in unrelated “social” environments (e.g. a charity activity) 
may provide a reliable signal for later strategic interactions (e.g. trust or PD games). Mulford, 
Jackson and Svedsäter (2008) support this idea. They also designed an unrelated coordination 
task prior to a social dilemma game. Their results show that this task had significant positive 
effects on cooperation – even more significant than pre-play discussion. Pre-play discussion 
may increase cooperation in dilemma games by creating group identity or by priming 
cooperative norms (see Bicchieri, 2002, for a review).  
In different information structures and matching procedures, these studies suggest that a 
precedent of playing another game may influence the results of the subsequent game. It seems 
that the similarity of the games (Knez and Camerer, 2000; Ahn et alii, 2001) as well as the 
emergence of a group identity norm (Mulford, Jackson and Svedsäter, 2008) induce more 
cooperation. On the other hand, Albert et alii (2007) show that the possibility of information 
spillover between unrelated (social) environments may increase cooperation in subsequent 
dilemma games.  
We ran a repeated one shot PD game experiment, and compared the subjects’ observed 
behaviors according to whether they took part in a donation game or not, with no descriptive 
similarity between the two games. Our purpose was to test whether a precedent of play in a 
donation game could modify cooperation in a repeated one shot PD game while the subjects 
were not informed that there would be a subsequent PD game. In an analytical game 
theoretical framework, under the assumption of selfish preferences, this donation game had a 
unique Nash equilibrium consisting of not giving any money. However, in a behavioral 
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economic framework, under the assumption of non selfish preferences, it could generate 
other-regarding behaviors.  
As the experimental evidence shows it (Andreoni and Miller, 1993; Cooper et  alii, 
1996), one-shot PD games played with a random stranger re-matching procedure exhibit 
lower initial and overall levels of cooperation than in the experimental repeated games. This is 
why we chose this matching procedure to assess more finely any impact of the donation 
game. Moreover, as this impact was significant for one-shot games, it was likely that it would 
be even higher in repeated games.  
While our design was close to that of a “connected game”, our protocol was different 
from that of Albert et alii (2007). In our donation game, anonymity was partially removed, 
and subjects could collectively discuss the donation share. We preferred a face to face 
discussion to a communication via electronic chat. Indeed as Luhan, Kocher and Sutter (2009) 
note it, the former captures a richer contextual field or personal encounters when teams make 
decisions. Electronic chat provides a more controlled environment by preserving anonymity, 
but teams are also observed to take more selfish decisions in this context (Kocher and Sutter, 
2007; Güth et alii, 2007). Besides, the face to face discussion in our protocol was not free but 
organized by some rules, as detailed in section 2. Other differences between our experiment 
and the one by Albert et alii (2007) can be pointed out. First, subjects had the opportunity not 
to give any money to our charity, while it was not the case in Albert et alii (2007): in their 
experiment, subjects had to give at least 10% of their endowment. Second, there was no 
possibility of an explicit information spillover from our donation game to the PD game. This 
information spillover is an important feature of the Albert et alii experiment: Bicchieri (2002) 
reports that the "social identity" hypothesis predicts that making group membership salient 
may induce a cooperative orientation, and this hypothesis fits partly with their results. 
Regarding the second stage of the experiment, dedicated to the play of a PD game, Albert et 
alii (2007) used two subsequent games: a trust game and a PD game. They observe that the 
average cooperation rate is actually significantly higher in the trust game (45.37%) than in the 
PD game (41.36%). Thus, games are perceived differently by the participants. These results 
are obtained by using the strategy method for both PD and trust games and only measure 
players’ one-shot intentional decisions. They observed an increase in cooperation in that 
context, but as noted above, the experimental evidence shows that cooperation declines if the 
game is played many periods with the random matching procedure. Contrary to the choice 
made by Albert et alii (2007), our protocol therefore aimed at capturing the dynamics of 
cooperation with effective playing decisions in a strategic setting, preceded by a donation 
game. That is why the subsequent PD game was played 30 times, to assess the robustness of 
the cooperative behaviors.  
In our donation game, the collective discussion is followed by a private and anonymous 
vote on the share to give to the charity. The vote obeys the majority decision rule. In social 
psychology, there is a vast literature on the group decision making under majority and 
unanimity decision rules (see, for instance, Davis, 1973; Miller, 1985; Hinsz, 1999). This 
literature suggests that majority decision processes appear to be powerful and general in group 
decision making. In Economics and in Political Sciences, a recent literature uses game theory 
to examine the way that the interaction between the decision rule, the presence of pre-voting 
communication, and the level of preference diversity affects incentives for voters to reveal private 
information (Feddersen and Pesendorfer 1997, 1998; Austen-Smith and Feddersen, 2006). 
Though the evidence is sometimes mixed, many papers conclude that the unanimity rule may 
promote bad incentives for the revelation of information (Myers, 2010). We chose a majority 
decision rule for the vote in our donation game. However, we introduced incentives for subjects 
to vote unanimously (by including a premium if the votes are unanimous, even if the issue of   5
the unanimous vote is to not give any money to the charity). This unanimity premium may 
promote more careful examination of the decision at hand and facilitate social influence 
among group members, thus it is likely to favor a collective cooperative behavior (Song, 
2009). 
In Section 2 we present the design and procedure of the experiment, consisting of two 
experimental treatments. The first was a control treatment in which we ran 30 periods of a PD 
game with a random re-matching of the pairs in every period. In the second treatment, 
subjects played the donation game in the first phase and the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) game in 
the second phase. They were not informed at the beginning of the experiment that this second 
phase would occur. To ensure that the observed differences were not an artifact, in both 
treatments the PD game replicated exactly the random matching protocol of the experiment 
conducted by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006). We report the results in Section 3. Results of 
the control experiment (first treatment) exhibit the same behavioral patterns as those observed 
in Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006). In the second treatment, in view of the aforementioned 
studies in behavioral and experimental economics, we expected higher degrees of cooperation 
in the PD game than in the control PD game experiment. In fact, the cooperation levels in the 
PD games preceded by the donation game were significantly lower than those observed in the 
control experiment. Thus, our donation game actually increased defection and not cooperation 
in the PD game. We propose a discussion of our findings and conclude in Section  4.  
 
2. Experimental design 
 
2.1. PD Treatment: a control PD experiment with random stranger re-matching 
procedure 
 
This treatment replicates the “deterministic case of a repeated one shot PD game", the 
procedure adopted by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006). Our payoff matrix (Figure 1) reports 
the same payoffs as theirs, but ours are labeled in Euros instead of US dollars. Figure 1 shows 
the screen that participants saw in the experiment. However, the payoff matrix was labeled 
not with the real payoff amounts in the instruction copies, but with letters. The amounts in 
Euros appeared only once the experiment started.  
 
 
Figure 1. Feedback screen of the PD game 
   6
Subjects started the experiment with a participation fee of €6
5 and played 30 periods of this 
PD game against different opponents. They were not told the number of periods they would 
play. Pairings were anonymous, and after each period players were re-matched randomly with 
another opponent. Their payoff was their cumulative payoff over all the periods. Each player 
was credited each period with the amount of Euro-cents in the matrix. For instance, in one 
period in which both players cooperated, each one was credited with 0.105€. After each 
period, a player was informed of her decision, the decision made by the other player, her own 
payoff, and her cumulated playoff since the beginning of the experiment.  
 
2.2. DG Treatment: a donation game followed by a PD experiment with random 
stranger re-matching procedure  
 
Stage one: The donation game. 
The donation game was designed to achieve different objectives (Table 1). 
 
Objectives  Design answer  
Creating a “collective” feeling among 
subjects 
Removing anonymity by a short personal presentation 
of each subject 
Organizing a collective but controlled discussion 
process 
Favoring collective other-regarding 
behavior 
Making a donation to a charitable association presented 
in a movie (interview with the treasurer, conducted by 
experimenters)  
Avoiding leadership in the collective 
discussion 
Designing a chairperson and a monitor to the 
chairperson to ensure that each subject expresses his or 
her opinion 
Avoiding  a  desirability  bias  The collective discussion takes place while 
experimenters are not in the laboratory 
Avoiding peer pressure during the final 
decision to give or not 
Organizing a vote by secret ballots 
Avoiding strategic behaviors  The majority vote decides the amount of the donation 
that all the subjects will have to give, whatever their 
vote 
Designing incentives to coordinate in the 
vote procedure 
A premium is added by the experimenters to the 
monetary donation if unanimity is achieved in the vote 
Table 1. The donation game: objectives and design answer. 
 
General organization. The first phase of this treatment is a debate between the subjects 
on the possibility of giving a donation to a charitable association, from a personal endowment 
allotted at the beginning of the experiment. It is proposed that they use this money to make a 
donation to the “Banque Alimentaire” (Food Bank), a non-profit association which collects 
funds to finance actions in favor of underprivileged people in France. The players have the 
opportunity to donate a share of €0, €4 or €6 of their monetary endowment (€10 in five €2 
coins) to the Food Bank. The residual, non-donated endowment is kept by the subjects. After 
a discussion on whether to donate or not, the choice of the share is determined by a vote with 
secret ballot. The share which obtains the majority of the votes is imposed on the whole 
                                                           
5 This amount corresponds to the average amount kept by the subjects at the end of the donation game in the DG 
treatment, before playing the PD game (see Part 2.2.). This introduction of a participation fee in the control 
treatment may induce a similar income as in the donation game treatment, though subjects may still perceive it 
differently, as pointed out by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007).   7
group. If the vote is unanimous on one of the three shares (including €0), the experimenters 
add €16 for the Food Bank. The group's donation is then sent to the association. Should 
subjects not agree with this protocol, they can leave the laboratory and keep their initial 
endowment. Actually, in the experiment, all subjects did agree with the protocol that we 
proposed.  
Procedure. When they arrive in the laboratory, subjects are randomly assigned places in 
the room. They find an envelope on their table, containing their €10 endowment. To inform 
the subjects of the Food Bank's  missions, they are shown a movie consisting of a short 
interview conducted by one of the author
6 with a local manager of this charity. The 
experimenters then publicly read the instructions, which explain the rules of the discussion 
and of the vote. After this reading, each subject briefly introduces him- or herself to the 
others, simply giving his or her first name and family name. To prepare the discussion, the 
experimenters then randomly appoint a chairperson to make sure that each subject expresses 
him- or herself, as well as a monitor who has to report to the experimenters whether the 
chairperson completed this task or not. Apart from their respective tasks, these two 
participants take part in the discussion and in the subsequent vote. The experimenters leave 
the room. Inside the room, in a first discussion round, each subject must individually express 
his or her donation intention to the others. In a second discussion round, each subject must 
express what he or she thinks it would be desirable for the group to vote. The discussion must 
not exceed 20 minutes. After the discussion, the experimenters go back to the room and 
organize the vote. After this vote, the individual donations are collected and may be increased 
by the experimenters’ premium (€16) in case of unanimity. The money collected in cash is 
then converted into a check to the Food Bank. This check is put into a stamped envelope, and 
a subject is chosen randomly to post it
7. 
Stage two: The prisoner’s dilemma game. 
This stage replicates the procedure followed in the PD treatment (see above). In the 
donation game, subjects are not informed that this second stage will occur. 
 
3. Experimental results 
Our experiments involved a total of 134 subjects (56 in the PD game alone, and 78 in 
the PD game preceded by the donation game) and were conducted between April and October 
2007 (Table 2). Subjects were undergraduates with no background in game theory, although 
some of them were from Economics Departments. Particular care was taken to recruit subjects 
from different universities and different departments (in each session, no more than two 
students belonged to the same department). Since the arrival of the subjects in the lab to the 
payment in cash, an experiment lasted about one hour for the "PD" sessions, one hour and 30 
minutes for the "DG" sessions. In both types of sessions, subjects earned an average of €20.  
The results of the five sessions for the donation and the prisoner's dilemma 
games (Sessions 1 to 5) and of the four sessions of the prisoner's dilemma game (Sessions 6 to 
9) are given in Table 2 below. In the last rows we also give the results of Bereby-Meyer and 
Roth (2006). 
                                                           
6One of the authors conducted the interview but he did not conduct personally the experiment. Besides, he was 
not presented by the experimenters in action in the lab as another person responsible for the experiment.   
7 Each subject was informed that the Food Bank had received the check.   8
Nb of Donation Game Average rate
subject results of cooperation
Session 1 16 Donation Game No Unanimity 6,04%
Session 2 16 Donation Game Unanimity for 4 € 7,71%
Session 3 16 Donation Game No Unanimity 4,58%
Session 4 16 Donation Game Unanimity for 4 € 19,58%
Session 5 14 Donation Game Unanimity for 4 € 9,05%
Session 6 14 One-shot PD - 17,14%
Session 7 14 One-shot PD - 24,29%
Session 8 16 One-shot PD - 15,42%
Session 9 12 One-shot PD - 29,72%
BM-R session 1 10 One-shot PD - 18,67%
BM-R session 2 10 One-shot PD - 22,33%
BM-R session 3 18 One-shot PD - 21,30%
BM-R session 4 18 One-shot PD - 12,59%
BM-R session 5 10 One-shot PD - 21,67%
Treatments
 
Table 2. Sessions and number of subjects, Donation and Cooperation results for the two treatments. 
 
Figure 2 displays the average rates of cooperation per period in both treatments, as well 













Figure 2: Average rates of cooperation as a function of the periods of the different treatments: Prisoner's 
Dilemma game (PD), Donation Game and Prisoner's Dilemma (DG). The results of Bereby-Meyer and Roth 
(2006) (BMR) for one-shot PD games are also represented. 
 
In the DG treatment, as all subjects within each session already communicated with each 
other, one session provides only one independent observation. In the PD treatment, there is 
also only one independent observation per session, as all subjects are matched with each other 
and receive feedback between periods (what the opponent played and the resulting payoff).   9
Consequently, all statistical tests provided in this section are based on these independent 
observations for the DG treatment and for the PD treatment
8.  
 
3.1. Cooperation in Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) vs cooperation in the PD treatment  
According the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon Two-Sample test
9, the average rate of 
cooperation over all the periods in the PD treatment is not significantly different from the one  
calculated in the experiment by Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) (p-value = 0.6242). In our 
experiment the rates of cooperation are quite high in the first period of all the sessions of the 
PD treatment (between 50% and 66.67%). Cooperation then declines steeply after two or 
three periods, before remaining close to rates of 15% from the 15th period. According the 
exact Wilcoxon signed-rank two-sided test, the average rate of cooperation in the PD 
treatment over the five last periods (16.64%) is significantly different from the average rate of 
cooperation over the first five periods, i.e. 36.22% (p value = 0.003). This result confirms the 
traditional observation obtained in experimental analysis of the PD: subjects in prisoner’s 
dilemma games in which they are re-matched with different subjects each period, are found to 
cooperate less as they gain experience. In other words, although they learn to cooperate in the 
early periods, this cooperation breaks down with the number of repetitions of the game. If 
other subjects learn not to cooperate, then the rewards of cooperation for a subject will be 
fewer, which will make cooperation even more difficult.  
 
3.2. Cooperation in the PD treatment vs cooperation in the DG treatment 
 
Rate of cooperation
in period 1 in the first five periods in the five last periods in all periods
PD Session 1 0.5000 0.3143 0.1571 0.1714
PD Session 2 0.6429 0.3429 0.2000 0.2429
PD Session 3 0.5000 0.3750 0.0750 0.1542
PD Session 4 0.6667 0.4167 0.2333 0.2972
Average 0.5774 0.3622 0.1664 0.2164
DG Session 1 0.3125 0.1750 0.0000 0.0604
DG Session 2 0.4375 0.2750 0.0500 0.0771
DG Session 3 0.5000 0.2250 0.0000 0.0458
DG Session 4 0.5000 0.3250 0.1750 0.1958
DG Session 5 0.5000 0.1857 0.1857 0.0905
Average 0.4500 0.2371 0.0821 0.0939
Average rate of cooperation
Table 3. Average rate of cooperation in the different sessions 
 
Except for Session 4, we find that the average rates of cooperation in the DG treatment 
are lower than the rates in the PD treatment (table 3). According the Mann-Whitney Wilcoxon 
Two-Sample test, the average rate of cooperation over all the periods in the PD treatment is 
significantly different from the one observed in the DG treatment (p-value = 0.0501). While 
the average rates of cooperation are similar in both treatments in the first period (p value = 
0.0864), the average rate of cooperation over the first five periods in the PD treatment 
(36.22%) is significantly different from the average rate of cooperation over the first five 
                                                           
8 This choice is the most rigorous but it prevents a specific analysis of differences in behaviors in the PD game in 
the DG treatment according the issue of the vote in the donation game (unanimity or no unanimity) and the 
amount finally donated by the subjects. On the other hand, the content of discussion in the DG sessions might 
have some influence on results, but we have no data to test this. Indeed, as far as possible, we wanted to avoid 
subjects' expectations that they could be observed by the experimenters during the debate of the donation game 
(cf. details in the "procedure" part). 
9 All the Mann-Whitney tests that we made are two sided tests.    10
periods in the DG treatment, i.e. 23.71% (p value = 0.0275). Nevertheless, the average rates 
of cooperation over the last five periods in the two treatments (16.64% vs 8.21%) are not 
significantly different (p value = 0.1416).  
The precedent of a donation game leads to rates of cooperation which are lower than 
those observed in the PD treatment (especially in the beginning of the play of the PD game).   
  
4. Discussion 
This work studied the effect of a precedent of a donation game on cooperation in a 
repeated one shot prisoner's dilemma (PD) game. The question of the precedent effect on 
cooperation in dilemma games has been explored by a number of recent experimental studies 
(Knez and Camerer, 2000; Ahn et alii, 2001; Albert et alii, 2007; Mulford, Jackson and 
Svedsäter, 2008). Regarding such effects and apart from their different designs and 
procedures, these experiments conclude either with no effect or with a positive and significant 
effect on cooperation. Our results contrast sharply with the findings of the aforementioned 
studies, as this precedent of a donation game – supposed to generate other regarding behaviors 
– encouraged and amplified defection behaviors in the PD game. We observed in our 
experiment that the rates of cooperation in the "donation game" (DG) treatment are 
significantly lower than the rates observed in the control "prisoner's dilemma" (PD) treatment. 
Thus, we support experimental evidence showing that in the prisoner's dilemma games with 
random re-matching of the players in each period, subjects cooperate less as they gain 
experience. This result is all the more clear as we analyzed the behaviors in the first five 
periods, contrary to Knez and Camerer (2000), Ahn et alii (2001), and Albert et alii (2007) 
who refer only to the first period of the PD game when reporting the effect of a precedent 
game. This suggests that it is important to analyze the dynamics of behaviors in the whole 
game. Bereby-Meyer and Roth (2006) interpret this result as a "learning effect" (on playing 
the Nash equilibrium). Not only does our control PD treatment confirms it; our data also 
suggest that our donation game precedent accentuated this effect in the subsequent prisoner's 
dilemma game. Regarding the individual behaviors, we also found that 30.77% of the subjects 
never cooperated in the DG treatment, while only 5.36% failed to cooperate in the PD 
treatment. These results suggest that the subjects learned to defect instead of cooperating. We 
propose below a discussion of this result.  
This result contributes to experimental evidence that reports systematic behavioral 
differences in decision making between individuals and groups in intellective tasks
10. While 
many economic decisions in the society are in fact made by (small) groups, economic theory 
typically does not address the influence of the type or nature of the decision maker - either 
being an individual or a group – on actual decisions. However, there is now a growing body 
of evidence in experimental economics showing that people in groups are more strongly 
motivated by profit maximization and act more selfishly than when they take decisions 
individually. This result is observed in signaling games, in which groups play more 
strategically (Cooper and Kagel, 2005), in the centipede game (Bornstein et alii, 2004), in 
which groups exit at earlier stages and in most of the simple bargaining experiments 
(Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998; Cox, 2002). In other games, the evidence is mixed. For instance, 
in a gift-exchange game, Kocher and Sutter (2007) observe no difference between groups and 
individuals if giving a gift is relatively cheap and face to face communication is allowed, but 
show that groups act more selfishly if they communicate through a computer network. In 
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market games, groups are observed either to make fewer profits (Cox and Hayne, 2006) or 
more profits (Blinder and Morgan, 2005) than individuals.  
The above literature compares decision making using a "between" subjects procedure, 
while we used a "within" procedure. Two papers used a within procedure as we did to regard 
the effect of making a group decision on subsequent individual behavior in the case of a 
dictator game. Cason and Mui (1997) report an altruistic shift from group to individual 
decision making, while Luhan et alii (2009) in a modified design find a selfish shift (2009). 
However, even if we observed also a selfish shift in our experiment, the design of our 
experiment is very different, as our precedent of donation game can be considered as a task 
unrelated to the subsequent PD game. Besides, to explain their contradictory evidence in 
comparison with Cason and Mui (1997), Luhan et alii (2007) conjecture that using an 
electronic form of communication instead of a face to face protocol could be the driving force 
behind the different findings.  
Then, why did we observe this shift from a collective other regarding behavior to an 
individual self interested behavior? Two possible explanations can be proposed. First, in our 
case, the design of the consensus decision making chosen to generate social links in the 
precedent activity may have negatively influenced subsequent cooperation. As far as possible, 
we introduced into this game some characteristics of a “social” activity: pre-play discussion, 
gift to a charity, collective decision mechanism. Thus, in line with the aforementioned 
literature on the effect of a precedent, we expected subjects to cooperate more often in the PD, 
by trying to "teach" them to do so with the help of this donation game. However, in this game, 
from a game theoretic point of view, cooperation (i.e. positive donation) is not an equilibrium. 
We designed a precedent in which our subjects are only "asked" to cooperate, whereas in a 
precedent based on a coordination game, cooperation is "learned" as an equilibrium behavior. 
It may be this leaning process which makes cooperation a more prevalent behavior in the 
following PD-game, as evidenced by Knez and Camerer (2000) and Mulford, Jackson and 
Svedsäter (2008). Second, an alternative interpretation of observed behavior would be that, 
after making a donation, subjects have the impression that they "have done their duty" (maybe 
they have done it even more than they originally intended because of the non-anonymous 
design) and deserve to behave more selfishly in PD games. This interpretation is consistent 
with the recent findings by Brosig, Riechmann and Weimann (2007). They investigate the 
consistency of individual behavior within and across different classes of games (dictator and 
PD games) and the stability of individual behavior over time by running the same experiments 
on the same subjects at several points in time. They observe that other regarding preferences 
explain a high share of individual decisions only in the first wave of experiments. Other 
regarding preferences seem then, in their own words, to "wash out over time", and in the final 
wave of experiments only the selfish preferences deliver the best explanation of their results. 
Thus, in their experiment as in our own experiment, although we observed it in a different 
design and within the time scale of one experimental session, subjects might have felt 
"obliged" to display other regarding preferences once (in the donation game), before shifting 
to the selfish behavior.  
Finally, our results suggest that precedent effects which are supposed to improve 
cooperation in the dilemma games still need to be carefully investigated. These effects depend 
on the degree of similarity, the results of the tasks and games, and their respective content. 
From a methodological viewpoint, our results, like those of Brosig et alii (2007), question the 
prevalence and robustness of selfish or cooperative behaviors as they are observed in the lab. 
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